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I.
INTRODUCTION
People have increasingly begun using e-scooters to commute in
metropolitan areas. However, there may be an issue. Do people face privacy
issues every time they ride e-scooters? While the Fourth Amendment protects
people’s right to privacy, this right has become increasingly complicated as
society and technology have progressed. Courts have had to grapple with new
technology to determine if it violates people’s Fourth Amendment rights when the
government uses that technology to gather personal information. Now courts must
decide if tracking e-scooter rider locations violates the Fourth Amendment.
This article begins with an overview of the Fourth Amendment and
situations that implicate it.1 Then the article will provide a history of different
issues that courts have struggled with regarding the Fourth Amendment.2 This
discussion will include cell phones and tracking devices government agencies
have used to gather information against citizens.3 It will also discuss situations
that do not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy rights, even though the
situations seem as if they should.4
This article will then continue to explain the main focus of the article:
legislation implemented by some cities that requires e-scooter companies, and
other dockless transportation services like e-bicycles, to collect trip data and
return this data to the cities in exchange for operating permits.5 This article will
weigh the benefits of the law with the potential harms to users and discuss what, if
anything, seems like a better solution. 6
This article will compare the privacy implications of the new reporting
laws to both prior legal government surveillance and illegal unconstitutional
government surveillance.7 This article will argue that the new reporting mandate
does indeed implicate the Fourth Amendment.
II.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
To understand the privacy issues the new law implicates, it is first
necessary to understand the origin of privacy concerns, which requires an
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. In relevant part, the Fourth Amendment
states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” 8 But what does this mean for
modern privacy implications? Who does the Fourth Amendment protect, and how
are those people actually protected by the Fourth Amendment?
Determining who is protected under the Fourth Amendment is not as
simple as one would expect. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to protect
simply anyone who is physically within the United States; instead it protects those
1

See infra sections I and II.
Id.
3
Id.
4
See infra section II.
5
See infra section III.
6
See infra sections VIII, IX, and X.
7
See infra section IX.
8
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2
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individuals who have “sufficient connection” to the country.9 This does not
necessarily mean that the person must be a citizen of the United States though—a
non-citizen may have protection as well. 10 In order to determine if the Fourth
Amendment protects a person, courts analyze whether the person “accepted some
societal obligations.”11
The next issue is the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection. The
Fourth Amendment only protects people from “governmental action.”12 It does
not protect against actions taken by a private person since the Fourth Amendment
“was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.” 13
This means the Fourth Amendment protects from invasions of privacy carried out
by government agencies such as police, other law enforcement agencies, or any
other governmental agency.14
However, it is important to note the Fourth Amendment protects more
than just actions by government agencies. The Fourth Amendment can control
actions by private parties in certain situations.15 For this to happen, the private
actor must convert into a government actor.16 This means that action by a private
company can violate a person’s constitutional right to privacy. 17 This happens
when the government requires or mandates the private company to perform the
action on behalf of or at the behest of the government.18 In order for the Fourth
Amendment to apply, the government agency in question has to do “more than
adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.”19
This private action to government action conversion often occurs when
governments show a “strong preference” that the surveillance take place.20 A
situation involving government “encouragement, endorsement, and participation”
is sufficient to “implicate the Fourth Amendment.”21 Additionally, a government
mandate can show this sort of action. 22
In summary, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals with sufficient
connection to the country who suffer an invasion of privacy from a government
actor, or a private actor acting on behalf of the government through a government
mandate to perform surveillance.23 Only if these requirements are fulfilled will a

9

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1989).
Id. at 273.
11
Id.
12
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.s’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 615.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 616.
22
Id.
23
See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1989); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Exec.s’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921).
10
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person have any claim against the company or government for intrusion on their
Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 24
III.
IN THE REAL WORLD
Although the application of the aforementioned principles does not seem
difficult, it can be more complicated than it seems. One situation worth discussing
is the use of cell site location information to gather information in Carpenter v.
United States.25 There, police tried to determine the identity of the perpetrator
who committed several robberies over the course of four months.26 In order to
find out this information, the police used cell site location data to determine who
was near the crime scene at the time the crime occurred.27 The police discovered
one of their suspects was contacted by a new phone number, and that new phone
number’s user was near the crime scene at the time the crime occurred.28
The Court determine that cell phone monitoring violated the individual’s
right to privacy.29 The Court stated that generally, people do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their movement in public places, so the use
of cell cite location data to determine an individual’s location in public is not
necessarily an issue on its face. 30 However the Court held that because the
monitoring was so precise and that it occurred over a long period of time there
was a privacy issue.31 Even though it tracked movements visible in public, the
level of detail and duration converted a potentially constitutional observation into
an unconstitutional observation.32
Two other cases that are related to this issue are best viewed side-by-side.
The first case ruled there was no constitutional issue with the monitoring, 33 and
the second ruled there was a constitutional issue. 34 First, we will discuss United
States v. Knotts, where the court ruled no Fourth Amendment issue occurred.35 In
that case, the police suspected an individual of manufacturing illegal drugs. 36 In
order to determine if this suspicion was correct, they tracked a container of
chemicals implanted with a radio transmitter from the chemical production
company to a cabin where the defendants were staying.37
For the same reasons that the Court ruled that Carpenter was a
constitutional violation, the Court ruled that this form of monitoring did not
violate the Constitution.38 The use of the technology only allowed law
24

Id.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
26
Id. at 2211–12.
27
Id. at 2213.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 2217.
30
Id. at 2215.
31
Id. at 2216.
32
Id. at 2216–17.
33
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
34
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–18 (1984).
35
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
36
Id. at 280–85.
37
Id.
38
Id.
25
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enforcement to track the vehicle carrying the contraband on public roads.39 This
monitoring could have been conducted without the radio transmitter, so the fact
that they used that technology did not change anything.40 The court stated while
this is a very efficient means of conducting the observation, it was not so intrusive
as to be a constitutional violation. 41 It is important that this tracking did not reveal
any information that could not have been seen with the naked eye. 42
United States v. Karo exemplifies the other side of this issue.43 This case
involved using the same radio transmitter technology as Knotts.44 In this case, as
well, law enforcement tracked a package along public roads.45 The court did not
consider this aspect of the case to be an issue; however, the government also
tracked the package once it went into the suspects’ house.46 This fact
differentiates the two cases.
The court found that this created a Fourth Amendment issue because it
showed information about the interior of the home where there is a protected
privacy interest.47 These two cases demonstrate that monitoring people in public
for a short time is acceptable, but once the monitoring starts to invade private
areas, it is no longer acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.
Perhaps the most crucial case related to the central issue of this article is
United States v. Jones.48 That case involved an individual who the police
suspected of trafficking narcotics.49 To investigate their suspicions, the police
attached a GPS device to the bottom of the suspect’s wife’s car, tracked the car’s
movements on public highways for thirty days, and then compiled all of that
location information.50 The defendant argued that the police violated his Fourth
Amendment right.51 The government counter-argued that it was not a search
because they only tracked the vehicle while it was on “public roads, which were
visible to all.”52 The government argued that because the car was on public roads
and anyone could see it, it was not a constitutional violation. 53
The majority opinion only addressed whether the police violated the
Fourth Amendment by physically intruding on the vehicle to install the GPS
devise.54 The concurring opinions went further, however, arguing that a
reasonable person would not expect to be continuously followed for such a long

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Karo, 468 U.S. at 713–18.
44
Id. at 708.
45
Id. at 713–18.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
49
Id. at 402–03.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 406.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 404–11.
40
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period of time.55 The concurrence posited that this type of continued surveillance
did more than merely show the path a person took each day.56 By compiling
extensive travel data about a person, the government is able to collect intimate
information about people.57 When the government records a person’s location for
a long period of time, they are able to determine information about the person
such as their professional associations, religious leanings, sexual associations, and
familial associations.58 The theory is that each piece of information comes
together to paint a picture that reveals intimate details of the person’s life and is
thus a violation of their privacy. 59
A helpful way to understand how many small pieces of information may
add up to enough information to be a constitutional violation comes from a
philosophical thought experiment known as the Sorites Paradox.60 This thought
experiment calls for a person to attempt establish at what point individual pieces
of grain become a heap of grain.61 The issue is that there is no obvious point when
a group of individual pieces of grain becomes a heap.62 This concept applies to
the issue which the concurring Justices struggled with in Jones. A court must
determine how many pieces of information about a person reaches the point
where the government has enough to violate the person’s reasonable expectation
of privacy. Each piece of information about where a person has been by itself is
not important, but when the pieces are taken together, they may reveal intimate
details of that person’s life, which constitutes a legitimate invasion of privacy.
IV.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND E-SCOOTERS?
What do these cases and the Fourth Amendment have to do with escooters? When these e-scooters were just a simple way to get around in cities,
then they had nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment. However, some cities
across the country have new regulations regarding e-scooters that may raise
constitutional concerns. 63
As populations continue to grow, cities will only become busier. In cities
like Los Angeles, normal automobile traffic continues to worsen and ride share
services like Lyft and Uber also crowd the road.64 Further, public transportation
55

Id. at 418–31.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Sorites Paradox, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Members, OPEN MOBILITY FOUND., https://www.openmobilityfoundation.org/members/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (noting that the cities that have joined Open Mobility as of 2/20/2020
are Austin, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky; Miami-Dade, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; San
Jose, California; Washington, District of Columbia; Los Angeles, California; Minneapolis,
Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Santa Monica, California; Chicago, Illinois; Miami, Florida; New
York City, New York; San Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington.)
64
Aarian Marshall, Why Uber is Fighting Cities Over Data on Scooter Trips, WIRED (May 13,
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-uber-fighting-cities-data-about-scooters/.
56
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and pedestrians contribute to the chaos. 65 Cities will become even more congested
as new technology is developed and becomes more common. 66 Thus, cities want
to ensure they are operating as efficiently as possible, and that all available
transportation products are accessible to as many people as possible. 67 In order to
achieve these goals, cities must collect data.68 They need the data not only to
determine how to allocate funds for infrastructure, but also to ensure that
companies are placing the mobility products evenly throughout different income
areas.69
Early in 2019, an article introduced a new mandate implemented in Los
Angeles, California.70 The article starts out light heartedly and states: “Los
Angeles is very nosy about where people are going to be dorkily bopping around
on e-scooters.”71 Subsequently, the article explains the real issue behind the
mandate. The city will only allow e-scooter companies to place their products
within the city if they agree to provide e-scooter location data to the city.72 To
“operate in Los Angeles[,] . . . the firms had to agree to allow the city to share
anonymized data, updated every 24 hours, on where each scooter or bike trip
starts, where it ends, and its route through the city.”73
Seleta Reynolds, the General Manager of the Los Angeles Department of
Transportation (LADOT), spoke at MWC Barcelona, a conference for new
technologically-advanced city planning ideas.74 She spoke about how LADOT’s
new program is developed to manage and keep track of e-scooters and other
micromobility devices.75 The program is called “Mobility Data Specification,”
and it is “comprised of a set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that
create standard communications between cities and private companies to improve
their operations.”76 The program “allow[s] cities to collect data that can inform
real-time traffic management and public policy decisions to enhance safety,
equity and quality of life.”77 The city states that the purpose of the new mandate is
to allow the city to operate smoothly and successfully manage the congestion that
comes with a large population. 78 Among other things, the city would use the
65

Id.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Jason Torchinsky, Los Angeles Says E-Scooter Companies Have to Share Location Data,
JALOPNIK (Mar. 22, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://jalopnik.com/los-angeles-says-e-scooter-companieshave-to-share-loca-1833490770.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Marshall, supra note 64.
74
Amy Nordrum, Los Angeles to Require Scooter Companies to Share Data, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Feb. 19, 2019, 20:30 GMT), https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/wireless/mwc-barcelona-2019-losangeles-to-require-scooter-companies-to-share-data.
75
Id.
76
Global Coalition of Cities Launches the ‘Open Mobility Foundation’, OPEN MOBILITY
FOUND. (Jun. 25, 2019), https://www.openmobilityfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
10/OpenMobilityFoundationLaunch_NewsRelease_25June2019_final2-1.pdf.
77
Id.
78
Nordrum, supra note 74.
66
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information to determine where scooters are and what areas need more devices.79
The purpose of having the data is to integrate “all of [the] information into a
dashboard that would display all public and private transportation options that are
currently in use throughout the city.”80 Ultimately, the goal is to make traveling
safer and easier for everyone in the city.81
What sort of information do cities want to collect? LADOT and other
cities implementing the regulations require companies to turn over “[r]oute
information … after the trip has completed and within 24 hours [that] doesn’t
include the name, age, gender, address of the user.”82 The cities also require
“companies to provide the start trip and end trip of every vehicle as trips start and
trips end to make sure scooters are being parked legally and within the terms of
the permit.”83 The cities requires the data to be turned over, or else they will not
provide operating permits for the companies to place their scooters in the city. 84
The cities claim they can do this because they have “direct regulatory authority
over their sidewalks, where the shared scoots need to park.”85
The City of Santa Monica, California issued a report detailing information
regarding the new policy surrounding the e-scooters and e-bikes.86 The report
discussed the city's planned treatment of mobility device data.87 The report also
discussed tracking e-scooters and e-bikes.88 The city states that “[i]t is preferred
that devices have enhanced GPS equipment that provides the locational accuracy
needed to virtually designate a ‘hub’ or ‘station’ system for device parking, to
track trip path, to restrict speed in designated areas.”89 Santa Monica also states
they are not collecting any user's personal information.90
California cities are not the only cities requiring mobility device data to be
turned over in exchange for a license to operate dockless vehicles.91 Austin, Texas
is adopting similar requirements. To operate e-scooters within the city, companies
must report trip data to the city.92 In a report Austin released, the city states a
“[l]icensee shall provide the Director … with real-time and historical information
79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Alfred Ng, The Majority of Scooters in LA Are Going to Share Your Location with the City,
CNET (Mar. 22, 2019, 11:39 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/the-majority-of-scooters-in-la-aregoing-to-share-your-location-with-the-city/.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Aarian Marshall, Still Smarting from Uber, Cities Wise up About Scooter Data, WIRED
(Sept. 18, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/cities-scooter-data-remix-uber-lyft/.
86
City of Santa Monica Shared Mobility Device Pilot Program Administrative Regulations,
CITY OF SANTA MONICA (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.smgov.net/uploadedFiles/Departments/
PCD/Transportation/Regulartors.pdf.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Shared Mobility Services, AUSTINTEXAS.GOV, http://austintexas.gov/micromobility (last
visited Feb. 22, 2020).
92
Memorandum Dockless Mobility Rules Update, CITY OF AUSTIN (Nov. 9, 2018),
www.austintexas.gov/edims/pio/document.cfm?id=310384.
80
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for their entire fleet through a documented web-based application programming
interface.”93 The city also emphasizes that they have privacy safeguards in place
to protect the identities of users.94
After the LADOT developed their initial program, “Mobility Data
Specification,” the program started to gain traction and more cities than Santa
Monica and Austin began using it. 95 In fact, more than fifty cities across the
United States began using the MDS program.96 In June 2019, the “Open Mobility
Foundation” (OMF) was formed.97 The OMF began managing the original
LADOT Mobility Data Specifications program and partnered with OASIS, a
company that hosted and allowed municipalities to use the program to manage
their cities.98 Currently, the United States members of the OMF include: San
Diego, California; Long Beach, California; San Jose, California; Los Angeles,
California; San Francisco, California; Santa Monica, California; Detroit,
Michigan; Denver, Colorado; Columbus, Ohio; Pittsburg, Pennsylvania;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Austin, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky; Miami-Dade,
Florida; Miami, Florida; Washington DC; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Portland,
Oregon; Chicago, Illinois; New York City, New York; and Seattle, Washington. 99
All of these cities enact these regulations and require access to the
dockless vehicles' routes and end locations so they can attempt to organize their
city and help it run as smooth as possible. They want to use the program to
“determine who’s adhering to the regulations and whether they’re complying.” 100
Does a city need to know a micromobility device's trip data to run the city
efficiently? Is there some other way to make sure there are scooters in the right
area without recording of the citizens trip data when they ride e-scooters?

93

Director Rules for Deployment and Operation of Shared Small Vehicle Mobility Systems,
AUSTIN TRANSP. DEP’T. 10, https://austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Transportation/
Dockless_Final_Accepted_Searchable.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
94
Id. at 9.
95
Global Coalition of Cities Launches the ‘Open Mobility Foundation’, supra note 76.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Members, supra note 63.
100
Marshall, supra note 85.
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V.
MOBILITY COMPANY RESPONSES
There are several primary mobility companies that provide e-scooter and
e-bike services.101 While the regulation has the same impact on how the
companies can operate their business, there are varying reactions to the new
legislation.102
Uber, a large player in the alternate transportation industry, is not
supportive of the new rules because they do not want to turn over the location
data.103 Uber fought back against the regulations and the Department of
Transportation thereby granted them only a temporary operating permit in Los
Angeles because they would not agree to turning over the location data.104 Uber’s
issue with the new regulations is the privacy implications it has for their
customers.105 Uber told Motherboard, the technology division of Vice News, that
“[u]nder current and proposed privacy legislation in the United States, private
companies are expected to demonstrate specific data security and privacy
capabilities when dealing with personal information, including GPS data.” 106 This
legislation seems beneficial and that it would limit potential privacy issues,
however Uber’s statement indicates that the e-scooter issue may be larger than it
seems. Uber told Motherboard: “Despite repeated attempts by Uber and consumer
advocacy groups, we’ve received no assurance that LADOT is willing or able to
meet the same standard in protecting the privacy of our customers.”107
Uber is concerned that this data collection “constitutes government
surveillance, and would yield far more information about bicyclists and scooter
riders than is available for drivers or transit commuters.”108 In a letter to
Reynolds, Uber said that it was a “massive overcollection of data about the
movements of bike and scooter users.”109 However, Uber’s worries extend past
scooters.110 The company fears that “cities like LA may begin to demand user
data on other modes of transportation.”111 The company released a statement
saying they “are concerned that privacy-violating provisions of MDS will be
expanded to other modes of transportation.”112
Lime, one of the other major micromobility companies, is more supportive
of the regulations requiring sharing location data. 113 Lime explained to
101

Joseph Cox, Scooter Companies Split on Giving Real-Time Location Data to Los Angeles,
VICE (Mar. 19, 2019, 5:43 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yw8j5x/scooter-companieslocation-data-los-angeles-uber-lyft-bird-lime-permits.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Cox, supra note 101.
108
Laura J. Nelson, Data Privacy Debate Emerges Out of L.A.’s Scooter Craze,
GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY (Mar. 18, 2019) https://www.govtech.com/transportation/DataPrivacy-Debate-Emerges-Out-of-LAs-Scooter-Craze.html.
109
Marshall, supra note 64.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Cox, supra note 101.
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Motherboard that “Los Angeles serves as a valuable model for other communities
and is a real solution to easing congestion, curbing pollution and increasing
mobility options.”114 Lime supported making the products safer and ensuring the
products reach more people who may need them.115 However, they failed to
address Uber's privacy concerns. 116
Bird, another micromobility company, also gave a statement to
Motherboard addressing the new Department of Transportation regulations as
well as addressing potential privacy concerns.117 Bird said, “[f]rom the beginning,
Bird has been steadfastly committed to the privacy of our riders. We want to
partner with cities as they build and improve their infrastructure so that e-scooters
and other micromobility options are available and safer for more people, while
ensuring the privacy of our riders.”118 Bird further expressed that it “look[s]
forward to continuing to work with LADOT and other cities on the responsible
implementation of mobility management tools and data sharing.” 119 Bird’s trust of
LADOT and the OMF with its customer’s privacy is implicit in this statement, in
contrast to Uber. Further showing the trust in the regulations, Bird is a member of
the OMF.120
Lyft did not give a statement about the new legislation121 but like Uber,
supports “legislation that would restrict what kinds of data cities are allowed to
collect.”122
The companies controlled by these new regulations are not the only ones
who have made statements regarding the potential privacy issues. These concerns
are explored in the next section.
VI.
PRIVACY CONCERNS
Jason Torchinsky concludes his article, Los Angeles Says E-Scooter
Companies Have to Share Location Data, by stating, “more data in more hands
means more potential for risk.”123 This statement clearly states the concerns that
many people have. The author posits that the regulations and the benefits are
reasonable but “concerns about user privacy are real.”124 This author is just one of
many who has concerns. The City of Los Angeles attempted to alleviate some of
these concerns and promised “to aggregate the anonymized data, de-identifying
and destroying the information it did not need. It would only allow law
enforcement access to the info through subpoena. And the city pledged to be very

114

Id.
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Members, supra note 63.
121
Id.
122
Aarian Marshall, These Cities Will Track Scooters to Get a Handle on Regulation, WIRED
(June 25, 2019, 6:36 PM) https://www.wired.com/story/these-cities-will-track-scooters-handleregulation/.
123
Torchinsky, supra note 70.
124
Id.
115
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careful before releasing any trip info to the public.”125 However, many are still
worried about the potential privacy violations.
One organization that objects to the data collection is the “Electronic
Frontier Foundation” (EFF), a nonprofit that defends “digital privacy, free speech,
and innovation.”126 The EFF became involved because data collection raises
privacy concerns. The EFF addresses the privacy concerns surrounding
micromobility devices head-on and talks about privacy problems related to their
data collection.127
The EFF accepts that the cities could remove personally identifiable
information, but it says that the removal does not remedy the privacy concerns.128
The EFF says that when consumers use e-scooters or other micromobility devices
habitually, it is extremely easy to reidentify the individual users. 129 The
organization discusses privacy issues similar to those recognized in the Jones
concurrence.130 The discussion says that “[t]ime-stamped geolocation data could
also reveal trips to medical specialists, specific places of worship, and particular
neighborhoods or bars.”131 In other words, the tracking could gather intimate
information that invades a user’s privacy. The collection is also an issue because
as long as the cities have data, other organizations, such as law enforcement
agencies or other third parties, could then reidentify the user.132
The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) also spoke out against
the e-scooter data collection.133 The CDT is a group that works to defend online
civil liberties and human rights.134 The organization tries to solve policy issues
related to the internet.135 One of the organization’s pillars is limiting government
surveillance.136 In a letter to the LADOT regarding the Mobility Data
Specification program, the CDT warned that the data being collected was
extremely sensitive and therefore the collection must be justified and limited in a
correct manner as to not create privacy issues.137
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The CDT explains that location data is very sensitive, “especially when
collected over extended periods of time.”138 The CDT also shares the concern that
“[p]eople’s movements from place to place can reveal sexual partners, religious
activities, and health information.”139 The organization adds that the “U.S.
Supreme court has recognized a strong privacy interest in location data, holding
that historical cell cite location information is protected by the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.”140 The organization recognizes that LADOT
has marked the information as confidential, but calls for them to provide more
information including “how it will safeguard MDS data, including how long it
will retain the data; the specific purposes for which the data will be used; and how
the department will limit access and use to those specific purposes.” 141
The CDT goes into detail about the privacy issues, and explains that even
though the data is considered anonymous, there are still privacy implications
recognized by other government authorities. 142 The CDT identifies issues with
what the mandate considers not collecting any personal identifiable information
(PII).143 The data collecting program does not require the individual’s names to be
turned over, but this is not the only PII. 144 “MDS trip data includes the precise
start and end times and locations of trips, tied to persistent, unique device
identifiers (UDIDs) for each bike or scooter. UDIDs can be PII.” 145 This is an
issue because “according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), persistent
identifiers like UDIDs, MAC addresses, and static IP addresses are often
reasonably linkable to a particular person, computer, or device” and even the
California Consumer Privacy Act often recognized UDIDs as PII.146 When more
information is connected to the UDID, such as location and trip information,
“individuals can be personally identified with reasonable ease.” 147
The CDT refers to an experiment by Anthony Tockar to support of their
claim.148 Tocker is a data scientist, who holds a Master’s of Science Degree in
Analytics from Northwestern University.149 Tockar’s experiment proved that he
could identify individuals with di-identified trip data from New York’s Taxi and
Limousine Commission.150 In that experiment, Tockar only had a few data points
138
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but was still able to determine the individual taxi rider’s identity.151 The
information that is collected for the scooter management system is more detailed
than the information that Tockar used. 152 The location data that the MDS collects
is more detailed because it records locations from the trip extremely close to
where the rider starts and ends.153 The MDS does not have to take into account
limitations that come with tracking cars, such as parking constraints, which cause
the trips to end further from the actual destination.154 Since Tockar was
successfully able to re-identify individuals with only limited data points, it could
be much easier with the detailed data collected from the scooter trips.
The CDT brings up some concerns they believe could arise if the data
banks possibly reached the wrong hands.155 They are concerned that “[o]verbroad
tracking could itself become a barrier to entry for low-income and minority riders,
who already face disproportionate surveillance and scrutiny from law
enforcement and other authorities. Without appropriate safeguards restricting
access to the data, its collection could deter underserved riders.” 156 In addition,
the CDT discuss past misuse of private data-bases. They report that “[r]idesharing APIs have been abused for things like spying on ex-partners, and a 2016
Associated Press study found that law enforcement officers across the country
abused police databases to stalk romantic partners, journalists, and business
associates.”157 While these concerns are not confirmed, they are important issues
that should be considered when deciding to make this a policy standard across the
country, as this has become.158
The New York Times published an article that addressed an issue that is
analogous to the one at hand.159 The article explains how anonymous data is not
truly anonymous, and is actually very personal data.160 The article describes how
applications installed on your phone track your location, sometimes even every
few minutes.161 According to some businesses that receive the data, it is easy to
determine individual’s identity based on that data.162 The Times conducted an
experiment on their own, in which they reviewed anonymous location data and
151

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.; see also Sadie Gurman, AP: Across US, police officers abuse confidential databases,
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2016), https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e
16f43/ap-across-us-police-officers-abuse-confidential-databases.
158
Global Coalition of Cities Launches the ‘Open Mobility Foundation’, supra note 79. The
Open Mobility Foundation took control of the program that LADOT started, and is now partnered
with many cities across the country who all use the Mobility Data Specification program to track
the scooters that are in their cities.
159
Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller and Aaron Krolik, Your
Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-dataprivacy-apps.html.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
152

40-2

JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY

41

determined the individual’s identity, where she went for doctor’s appointments,
where she went to a Weight Watchers meeting, and when she stayed at her exboyfriends house.163 The individual who was identified allowed The Times to
conduct experiment and commented on the experiment.164 She said “It’s the
thought of people finding out those intimate details that you don’t want people to
know.”165 While this is different than the scooter trip information, it provides
another example of how anonymous data can be used to ascertain people’s
identity’s and intimate details about them.166 Similar to the previous cases, data
that can determine intimate details about a person may be considered an
unconstitutional government surveillance.167
In The Times article, they state that “[t]here is no federal law limiting the
collection or use of such data.”168 While the data collection just describes seems
nearly identical to the Data Mobility System’s requirements, there are key
differences. This article will explain why the data collection just described is
legal, whereas the Data Mobility System is not legal in a later section.169
The Times article is not the only source to show the supposedly
anonymous data is not actually private. A scientific study published in 2013
shows that even course, non-specific data could reidentify an individual with
significant ease.170
The researchers found that people’s movements were generally
highly unique and because of this, found that “this uniqueness means that
little outside information is needed to re-identify the trace of a targeted
individual even in a sparse, large-scale and coarse mobility dataset.” 171
This study “was performed using an anonymized mobile phone dataset
that contains call information for ~1.5 M users of a mobile phone operator.”172
“Each time a user interacts with the mobile phone operator network by initiating
or receiving a call or a text message, the location of the connecting antenna is
recorded.”173 Even with this lower level of specificity, it was “enough to uniquely
identify 95% of the individuals.”174 Comparing this to the very specific real-time
location data that the micromobility companies are required to submit, it is
evident that re-identification is an important concern.
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VII. RELATED LEGISLATION ISSUES
As is clear from their public responses to the requirements of the program,
Uber and Lyft do not support the requirement to report data in order to place their
products within the limits of the local municipalities. 175 The companies opposing
the new standard have done more than just release public statements voicing their
opinions on the matter.176 “Uber and some of its allies have begun to maneuver in
state houses.”177 They also supported state legislature that was favorable to
them.178 As of May 2019, Uber, Lyft, and Bird all supported California Assembly
Bill 1112 which “would prohibit local authorities from requiring companies that
offer shared scooters or bikes to submit data on individual trips.”179 This, of
course, would benefit the dockless mobility companies, and would allow them to
distribute their scooters wherever they want. It would also avoid the issue that this
article is talking about – forcing the scooter companies to turn over information
due to a regulatory scheme.
California Assembly Bill 1112 is more important than a normal state
legislature bill because “California has long been ground zero for new
technologies” and legislature surrounding the new technology may set a precedent
that other states will follow.180 As mentioned, the LADOT was first to use the
Mobility Data Specification before the Open Mobility Foundation took over its
operation.181 Considering the program started in Los Angeles and spread across
the country, it is easy to see why this proposed California Bill has national
implications as well. Other states will likely adopt similar legislation, just as they
adopted the Mobility Data Specification from the LADOT and the Open Mobility
Foundation.
Opponents of AB 1112 say that it would destroy the tool that LADOT
established, and would stop policy makers from being able to use the data
collected to decide “where to install a bike lane or how to ensure e-scooter
availability in low-income communities.”182 Opponents say that the Bill is a
preemption, and is being used as a “tool for Republican state legislatures to block
policies enacted by Democratic cities.” 183 They state that the micromobility
companies should talk to the city municipalities, rather than taking “their case
straight to Sacramento.”184 The reason for this is because “shared mobility is a
local jurisdictional matter. [C]ities are responsible for managing sidewalks,
streets, and public spaces…[and] are responsible for the enforcement of and
compliance with local and state laws that govern the public right-of-way.”185 The
175
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opponents say this Bill would not allow “urban officials to harness the rapid
evolution of mobility technology to promote safety and equitable access” which is
a valid concern.186 However, their concerns may be moot.
A closer look at the Bill itself shows that the concerns that the opponents
had were uncalled for.187 The California Legislative Information website shows
the Bill, strikethroughs, and revisions.188 The Bill originally was written to
“prohibit a local authority from imposing any unduly restrictive requirements on
mobility device providers that have the effect of prohibiting the operation of all
shared mobility providers in its jurisdiction.”189 However it was later amended to
say that the Bill would “allow a local authority to enact reasonable regulations on
shared mobility devices and providers within its jurisdiction, including, but not
limited to, requiring a shared mobility service provider to obtain a permit.” 190
Thus, the Bill was originally a preemption tool, as the opponents worried;
however, after the revision it would allow the local governments to control their
jurisdiction as they saw fit. Further reason to not worry is that the majority vote
on this Bill was to not enact it.191
However, a section was added to the California Vehicle code that directly
addresses micromobility regulation. Section 39057 says that:
(a) A local authority may enact reasonable regulations on shared
mobility devices and providers within its jurisdiction, including,
but not limited to, the following:
(1) Requiring that, before distribution of a shared mobility device,
a shared mobility service provider shall enter into an agreement
with, or obtain a permit from, the local authority with jurisdiction
over the area.192
This section allows for the cities to require mobility companies, such as Uber and
Lyft, to comply with the necessary requirements to obtain a permit to operate
within the jurisdiction. In other words, this is state legislation that allows the
MDS to be taken seriously, allowing local governments to enact their own city
ordinances requiring the data to be shared with the local governments in exchange
for a permit to operate. This Bill is not the only legislation that may be in play,
however.
The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) is an
act that “fleshes out an individual’s right to privacy under the state
constitution.”193 The act is “designed to block law enforcement agencies from
186

Id.
Cal. Legis. Assemb. B. 1112, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Laura Bliss, A Controversial Scooter Data Tracking Program Gains Traction, CITYLAB
(Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/08/scooter-ride-mobility-dataprivacy-laws-ecpa-los-angeles/596446/.
187

SPRING 2021

DO E-SCOOTERS IMPLICATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

44

accessing user data, including emails, text messages, and personal information
stashed online, without a warrant.”194 California is not the only state to have an
act that does this: “[o]ther states, including Maine, Vermont, and Utah, have
similarly clarified and bolstered existing federal privacy protections within their
own borders.”195 Some of the companies the Mobility Data Specification
impacted took it upon themselves to go to the California Legislature to obtain the
government’s opinion on the legality of the permit requirement. 196 The State
Legislative Counsel, which interprets state statutes to help inform lawmakers on
the legality of different issues, released their findings regarding the Mobility Data
Specification.197 The Counsel’s first finding was: “CalECPA restricts a local
government agency, as a political subdivision of the state, from requiring the
provision of real-time location data as a condition of an operating permit.” 198 The
second finding was: “A government entity is exempted from this restriction if a
specific rider directly consents to share their data—but not through a mobility
operator as an intermediary.”199
The head of the Mobility Data Specification program, Seleta Reynolds,
responded to the Legislative Counsel’s findings.200 Her response is that CalECPA
was meant to control law enforcement agencies. 201 She says:
CalECPA was not written to limit the actions of regulatory
agencies or to control the regulation of dockless mobility devices
in the public right-of-way by a local department of transportation.
In fact, there is no mention in either the statutory text or legislative
history of any intent by the Legislature to limit or restrict a
government regulator from using electronic data within the course
and scope of regulating entities that are not electronic
communications services.202
However, this has not stopped some companies from continuing to fight the
municipalities adopting the MDS.
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VIII. RELATED LITIGATION
At first, Uber agreed to turn over the requested information, however the
company decided that it did not want to comply and threatened to “[file] a lawsuit
and temporary restraining order” against LADOT in October 2019.203 Uber
refuses to follow the requirements all the way and contends that these
requirements that the city put in place “constitute surveillance.” 204 When the city
threatened to remove their permit if they did not comply, Uber responded by
saying: “[W]e will file a lawsuit and seek a temporary restraining order in the Los
Angeles Superior Court, so that a judge will hear these concerns and prevent the
Los Angeles Department of Transportation from suspending our permit to
operate.”205 Uber seems willing to work with the city, as long as they can protect
“the data privacy and security of [their] riders.” 206 At of the end of October 2019,
Uber had not filed the lawsuit, but remained in talks with the LADOT. 207
Subsequently, in March 2020, Uber filed a complaint in federal court
against LADOT alleging the Mobility Data Specification violated the Fourth
Amendment and that the tracking could reveal personal information about people
“such as where they live and work, where they go for social or romantic
interactions, and even what time they leave their office each day.” 208 Uber argues
that the Mobility Data Specification is not useful for assisting the city “in
planning bike lanes, or figuring out deployment patters in different
neighborhoods, or dealing with complaints about devices that are parked in the
wrong place, or monitoring compliance with permit requirements.”209 Instead,
Uber argues, it is “a tool for surveillance.”210
In addition to Uber, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and
the EFF also brought suit in federal court against LADOT for the same reasons. 211
The ACLU released a statement regarding the situation and said: “Renting an
electric scooter should not give the government the right to trace your every move
— where you start, where you end, and all stops, twists, and turns in between.”212
It is clear that the companies are suing LADOT based on their riders’
privacy rights, but LADOT claims there is no constitutional violation, but instead,
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the Mobility Data Specification serves the purpose of enabling the cities to run
smoother.213 But what are those benefits?

IX.

WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF THE MOBILITY DATA
SPECIFICAITION
Proponents of any new legislation must weigh the pros and cons to see if it
is worth enacting. The benefits to the community should be considered to see if
they outweigh the harm to the community. This article has covered the possible
privacy issues in depth above214 and has briefly mentioned benefits and the
purpose of the program, but it has not discussed the benefits that the MDS could
bring in much detail. Before we discuss the Fourth Amendment issues, and
possible solutions, if any are needed, we must fully understand both sides of the
coin.
The proponents of the program in place mainly point to benefits the city
government would have in organizing the city. 215 The main organizer of the
program, the Open Mobility Foundation, says the program will “allow cities to
collect data that can inform real-time traffic management and public policy
decisions to enhance safety, equity and quality of life.”216
The chief sustainability officer for LADOT, Marcel Porras, specified what
the city would use the program for. 217 He said that they would look at a map of
the city, see where the mobility devices are, and require the companies to move
them around to make the city more balanced. 218 Controlling the location of the escooters and other forms of mobile transportation could also benefit lower income
areas by requiring the scooter companies to redistribute the scooters or bikes to
underserved areas.219 The program would also be able to identify abandoned
mobility devices that have been in the same location for longer than five days. 220
The officials who developed the Mobility Data Specification said that they
specifically designed the program to not be limited to tracking scooters, but also
capable of tracking other forms of transportation like Uber and Lyft in the
future.221 The producers of the MDS were looking forward to potential future
issues including “autonomous vehicles” and “delivery drones.”222 Reynolds said
on behalf of the LADOT that “our job is to move people and goods as quickly and
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safely as possible, but we can only do that if we have a complete picture of what’s
on our streets and where.”223
It is uncontestable that this program would have benefits. If a city is able
to organize where different forms of mobility are, and make sure they are where
they need to be, as described above, the city will clearly have more control and be
able to run the city more efficiently. However, as discussed above, there are
privacy concerns. Are these benefits enough to outweigh the privacy concerns that
have been raised? And how big of an issue really are the concerns that have been
raised? This brings us to the main question of this entire article: how does the
location tracking relate to the Constitution?
X.

HOW DOES THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE DATA RELATE
TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In order to understand how requiring mobility companies to turn over
location data in order to receive an operating permit has anything to do with the
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, we must refer back to the case law that
was discussed in the beginning of this article,224 and compare it to the issue at
hand.225
As stated, the Fourth Amendment has several requirements that must be
fulfilled before it is implicated to protect any individual. 226 The first requirement
is that the individual seeking protection from the alleged violation must have
sufficient connection with the country. 227 This article will assume, arguendo, that
at least some of the e-scooter riders are United States citizens who the Fourth
Amendment protects.228 Therefore, the first requirement for the Fourth
Amendment’s protection is fulfilled.
The next requirement is that a government entity conduct the
surveillance.229 This is where the first issue arises. At first glance it appears that
private mobility companies are collecting data from the users.230 If that was the
entire story, then we would not have a Fourth Amendment issue; however, the
details are important. Here, it is more than just the private companies collecting
data.231
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As discussed above, the Fourth Amendment can control a private entity if
there are certain situations in place to convert the private action into state
action.232 In order for a private company’s action to become state action, the
government must strongly encourage the action, or it has to be a requirement of a
regulatory regime.233 In Skinner, a law that strongly encouraged a company to
drug test employees converted the private action into state action. 234
Comparing Skinner to the circumstances at hand makes it clear that the
private action from the mobility companies has converted to state action. Here,
the cities using MDS require companies who want to place their products within
the city limits provide location data in order to obtain an operating permit.235 This
regulation mandating the companies to turn over data in order to have an
operating permit creates a regulatory regime, thus turning the private action into
state action.
Therefore, since the users of the scooters have Fourth Amendment rights
that can be violated, and since the act of recording data becomes state action via
the government mandate, it seems that this would implicate the Fourth
Amendment. However, even if there are Fourth Amendment implications because
it is state action and the person has sufficient connections, some situations simply
will never violate the Fourth Amendment. 236 In order for the Fourth Amendment
to apply, there must be a search which violates the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.237
One of the situations that will usually never violate the Fourth
Amendment is when the when the person under surveillance is in public.238
Comparing that to the case at hand, we again seem to run into a roadblock. The
Mobility Data Specification wants to collect anonymous route data, including
where a scooter trip started and where it ended.239 Therefore, the data the MDS
collects only contains information about the person when they are in public. In
Knotts, the government tracked movement on a public road, and this was not
considered a search that violated the Fourth Amendment. 240 So it would seem that
the tracking is not an issue, and that the cities that use the MDS are free to collect
the data, since it is in public. However, there is another level to analyze.
While the movement may be in public, there are more privacy issues that
are not immediately apparent. A search occurs when a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is violated by government intrusion.241 Carpenter helps to
understand what a reasonable expectation of privacy is in the context of the
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circumstances at hand. In that case, the Court found that tracking an individual’s
movements with their cell phone records violated a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.242 Further, it did not matter that the movements they
tracked were movements that occurred in a public place.243 This was an issue
because the level of detail about the person that the tracking showed and the
duration of time that the government could tell where the person was. 244
A second case described above that should also be taken into account is
Jones.245 As discussed, the concurrence in Jones discussed how tracking people,
even if it is in public, could disclose information about them that violates their
reasonable expectation of privacy. 246 The concurrence reached this conclusion
because knowing the person’s location over a long period of time would disclose
intimate information that the Fourth Amendment tries to protect, 247 such as
religious information, sexual or familial association, or political associations.248
Since these details are so private, even tracking on public roads could be a
violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 249
This concept of revealing intimate information is what causes issues in the
circumstances at hand with the e-scooter tracking. The scooter rides will all be on
public roads, and since the cities want the companies to collect start and end
points and route data, the location data will all be information that is in public
view.250 This does not mean there are no issues, however; just like in Jones and
Carpenter, whoever holds the information about the trips, could discover intimate
details about the individual rider’s life, just like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation251 and the Center for Democracy and Technology252 are concerned
with.253 The scooter rider would be subject to the government knowing intimate
details about their daily lives, including information about their religious, sexual,
familial, and political life.
It does not matter that the companies anonymize the location data by
removing names, since realistically, even with anonymous data, the holder can
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still identify the person who is making the trips with a high level of accuracy. 254
So if the information is turned over to the government, it is an invasion of a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy if a court were to follow the guidelines
of Carpenter and Jones.
Proponents of the MDS may argue that it only requires the mobility
companies to turn over the information to the cities who want to manage this
information so they can organize their streets. 255 It does not require that the data
be given to law enforcement agencies, and that data will only be given to law
enforcement when there is a proper court order. 256 Those proponents may argue
that this information is harmless and would not have any criminal implications.
This argument is also similar to the argument that the LADOT made for why the
CalECPA did not apply to limit the cities from collecting the data. 257 However, in
response to this argument, we must refer back to the Fourth Amendment, and the
case law that clarifies it. 258 The Fourth Amendment is not written explicitly to
apply to only law enforcement, like CalECPA; instead, it applies to the
government broadly.259 To reiterate, when the government conducts surveillance
that infringes on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, there is a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.260 Therefore, it does not matter that the city
governments are only disclosing the information to law enforcement agencies
after they have a proper court order;261 the Fourth Amendment is still in play
when any type of government entity is conducting surveillance, 262 and that seems
to be implicated in this case. Keep in mind that the regulatory regime put in place
by the various cities has converted the private action from the mobility companies
to state action.263
XI.
SUGGESTIONS TO AVOID THE ISSUE
It is clear that as the population continues to grow, and more technology is
developed, cities will become busier and more congested, and there may be some
need to organize the congestion to keep it manageable, just like the cities claim.264
This is a valid concern. But at the same time, there is a competing interest of
citizen’s rights to be free from government intrusion into their intimate lives. 265 A
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balance must be found between these two valid and important interests. As Uber
and other mobility companies have made clear, they are willing to work with the
cities to reach the goals, as long as they can protect their rider’s privacy. 266
Cities should not ignore these offers to negotiate or other opportunities to
come to a creative solution. One potential solution which would still serve the
cities’ interests and also protect the rider’s privacy is to simply share the end
location of the scooter after the trip is done with no connection to any personal
information of the user. This data should be raw location data and not include any
PII or UDID information which can create privacy issues.267 That way, the city
would still be able to see where the scooters are, but would not have the real time
data, nor any connection to the users of the scooters. Admittedly, this would not
let the cities know where all scooters are at all times as they have wanted, but this
would be a good compromise between the two sides.
Even more beneficial to the rider’s privacy, the cities could take a handsoff approach and simply allow the mobility companies to manage their fleets in an
efficient manner. Because of the city planning and organization concerns, this is
less likely. But the government cannot invade the constitutional privacy rights of
its citizens on its path to city organization.
XII. CONCLUSION
As the world changes, and more technologies develop, courts have
struggled to keep up. However, they have always maintained a consistent attitude
of enforcing citizens’ constitutional protections. This is another issue that courts
will be grappling with in years to come. The lawsuits by Uber, the ACLU, and the
EFF against the LADOT show that privacy is not something to be taken lightly. It
is likely that there will be more litigation, and more issues that arise as the
governments try to push for more data. As Jamie Williams, a staff attorney for the
Electronic Frontier Foundation said, “Just looking at scooter data is too short
sighted – this is a model for getting access to data for other transportation …
Scooters are a really divisive issue, but a lot of those people also probably taking
Lyft and Uber and would feel differently about that data.” 268 Cities have an
interest in organizing their streets, but citizens have a fundamental right to privacy
under the Constitution. The privacy issues must be avoided, or the pending
lawsuits could turn into major clashes, or cities could infringe too far into their
citizens’ lives.
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